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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ventional analysis considers the importance of the statute's objectives,
but ignores the relationship between the discriminatory means em-
ployed and the achievement of these objectives.48 Until the Govern-
ment articulates a credible justification for punishing only the male,
courts must continue to invalidate gender-based statutory rape provi-
sions. The discriminatory means simply fail to promote the statutory
objectives. As the dissent in Michael M properly noted, there is no
justification for punishing only male participants of consensual hetero-
sexual intercourse with minors.4 9
If the legislative trend toward repealing gender-based statutory rape
provisions continues,50 the issue addressed in Hicks will become moot.
Until that occurs, however, many state courts will continue to reject the
Hicks analysis." This reaction is unfortunate because Hicks should
serve as a model for proper analysis under each prong of the equal
protection test.5 2 By granting certiorari in Michael M. , the Supreme
Court can adopt the Hicks approach and invalidate the California gen-
der-based statutory rape provision.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-REFUSAL TO PRO-
VIDE EXPERT WITNESS FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANT DENIES EQUAL
PROTECTION. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980). Ap-
pellant wounded one Maybank with a gunshot that paralyzed her and
allegedly caused her death eight months later. The State of South
Carolina charged appellant, an indigent, with murder.' Before trial ap-
48. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 9 and 10 supra and accompanying text.
51. The Supreme Court of Delaware has already rejected the Hicks analysis in Acosta v.
State, 417 A.2d 373, 375 (Del. 1980). The latest state court decision on the question, State v. Ware,
- R.I. - - 418 A.2d 1, 4 (1980), does not refer to Hicks, but the court's reasoning implicitly
rejects the Hicks analysis. By contrast, the single federal court that has considered the question
since Hicks apparently was influenced significantly by the Hicks analysis. Navedo v. Preisser, 630
F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980).
52. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
53. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Michael M on June 9, 1980. 100 S. Ct. 2984
(1980).
1. The state originally charged appellant with assault and battery with intent to kill, but it
changed the charge to murder following Maybank's death. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021,
1023 (4th Cir. 1980).
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pellant's court appointed attorney requested that the state provide
funds to hire a pathologist to determine the cause of death, which the
county medical examiner believed was a pulmonary embolism result-
ing from the paralysis. Appellant's attorney explained that a pulmo-
nary embolism may result from several causes' but that he was unable
to assess adequately the evidence and question the medical examiner
without expert assistance. The trial judge, despite statutory authoriza-
tion, denied appellant's motion for expert assistance.' A jury convicted
appellant of voluntary manslaughter,5 and the South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the conviction.6 After unsuccessfully petition-
ing for a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts and in federal district
court,7 appellant sought review from the United States Court of Ap-
2. Appellant's attorney estimated that the minimum fee for the pathologist's services would
be $400. Id
3. Id In the brief appellant's attorney submitted to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, he
cited a medical textbook that indicated that cirrhosis of the liver, which aflicted the decedent, may
cause an embolism. Id at 1026.
4. Although the trial judge indicated his willingness to provide an expert to assist appellant
with his defense, he overruled the motion on the ground that no funds were available for doing so.
Id at 1024. S.C. CODE § 17-287 (Supp. 1975) (current version § 17-3-80 (1979)), however, pro-
vide&
Appropriationfor expenses of appointedprivate counsel andpublic defienders.-In addition
to the appropriation in § 17-286, there is hereby appropriated for the fiscal year com-
mencing July 1, 1969 the sum of fifty thousand dollars for the establishment of the de-
fense fund which shall be administered by the State Treasurer. This fund shall be used
to reimburse private appointed counsel, public defenders, and assistant public defenders
for necessary expenses actually incurred in the representation of persons pursuant to this
chapter, provided that the expenses are approved by the trial judge. No reimbursement
shall be made for travel expenses except extraordinary travel expenses approved by the
trial judge. The total State funds provided by this section shall not exceed fifty thousand
dollars.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, on appellant's appeal, held that the statute encompassed
compensation for expert witnesses. State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 299, 210 S.E.2d 298, 302
(1974).
5. 618 F.2d at 1024.
6. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court said the trial court erred in its reason for
refusing to appoint an expert witness to assist appellant, the error was not prejudicial. The court
could not say that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The state's pathologist stated that the
autopsy had shown to the "highest possible degree of medical certainty" that the death resulted
from the gunshot wound, and the court said that appellant had not demonstrated that another
pathologist would have refuted the state's evidence. State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 299-300, 210
S.E.2d 298, 302-03 (1974).
7. Appellant alleged in his state habeas corpus petition that he was denied effective repre-
sentation because his attorney had not informed the trial judge of the statute providing funds for
the appointment of experts. In his two federal habeas corpus petitions, appellant alleged that the
refusal to appoint a pathologist denied him due process and equal protection, and that his counsel
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/18
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peals for the Fourth Circuit, which reversed8 and held: When an indi-
gent criminal defendant's trial presents a substantial question that
requires expert testimony for its resolution and defendant cannot de-
velop fully a defense without expert assistance, the refusal of a state
trial court to provide funds to hire an expert denies the defendant equal
protection of the law.9
The right of indigent criminal defendants to expert assistance has
evolved gradually over the past quarter of a century. In United States
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi'° the Supreme Court summarily rejected the con-
tention that the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires the
appointment of an expert to assist an indigent defendant with his de-
fense." The Court in Grin v. Illinois12 began to expand indigents'
rights when a majority 3 held that a state's refusal to provide free trial
"was ineffective because he did not obtain a pathologist to assist with his defense." 618 F.2d at
1025.
8. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of appellant's habeas corpus petitions and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id at 1027.
9. Id "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
I1. The Court dismissed the due process argument by saying that "[w]e cannot say that the
State has that duty by constitutional mandate." United States exrel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561,
568 (1953). The Court adopted the reasoning in McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951). The defendant in McGarty argued that his sixth amendment right to
court appointed counsel lacked substance because he could not adequately prepare a defense
without expert assistance. The McGarty court rejected the claim that a state court's failure to
appoint an expert denied defendant due process of law. The McGarty facts, however, provided a
narrow basis for the decision. Pursuant to state statute, two impartial psychiatrists examined the
defendant, who claimed he was mentally incompetent, and the state made the examination results
available to him. The court thus rejected his contention that the state should appoint a third
psychiatrist. The court avoided the broad constitutional question, saying that "how far the state
• . . is required under the due process clause to minimize this disadvantage [indigence] is a matter
which, in other contexts, may deserve serious examination." 188 F.2d at 155 (emphasis added).
McGarty was a capital case and thus fell within the Court's ruling in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), that state indigent defendants charged with capital crimes must be provided coun-
sel at the state's expense. The Court for years did not recognize the right of indigents to court
appointed counsel in noncapital state cases, saying that appointment of counsel in these instances
was constitutionally required only when the lack of counsel in a particular case would lead to
unfairness in the criminal prosecution. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72-(1942). Finally, in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court overruled Betts and required counsel in all
state criminal prosecutions.
12. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
13. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark joined Justice Black's opinion.
Justice Frankfurter, writing separately to emphasize that the ruling should apply only prospec-
tively, concurred in the result. Id at 13, 26.
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transcripts for indigents in noncapital cases violated the due process
and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment by effec-
tively denying indigents appellate review. "There can be no equal jus-
tice," Justice Black wrote, "where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has."' 4 Seven years later, Gideon v. Wain-
wright 5 held that a state scheme providing counsel for indigents only
in capital cases denied due process of law to noncapital defendants. In
addition the Court held in Douglas v. California 16 that whenever a state
grants criminal defendants a right to one level of appellate review, it
must provide counsel for indigents who desire the appeal. 7 Thus, al-
though the Court has never overruled Baldi, recent decisions have rec-
ognized' 8 that the fourteenth amendment due process guarantee
14. Id at 19. Justice Harlan, dissenting, complained:
[The] holding produces the anomalous result that a constitutional admonition to the
States to treat all persons equally means in this instance that Illinois must give to some
what it requires others to pay for .... mhe real issue in this case is not whether Illinois
has discriminated but whether it has a duty to discriminate.
Id at 34-35 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17. Other cases further undercut United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), by
expanding rights for indigent criminal defendants. See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)
(refusal to review denial of writ of error coram nobis solely because of indigence denies equal
protection); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (refusal to docket an appeal or petition for writ
of habeas corpus because an indigent prisoner could not pay statutory filing fee denies equal
protection); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (state court's refusal to allow appeal because indi-
gent defendant could not pay filing fee violates fourteenth amendment rights); Jacobs v. United
States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965) (refusal to appoint a psychiatrist at government expense to
assist indigent prisoner with hearing on petition seeking collateral relief from conviction denies
equal protection); United States v. Products Marketing, 281 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1968) (refusal to
provide funds for expenses necessary for adequate preparation of defense deprives indigent de-
fendants of effective assistance of counsel); Cohen v. Warden, Montgomery County Detention
Center, Rockville, Maryland, 252 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1966) (denial, because of indigence, of
appeal from denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus violates fourteenth amendment rights)
(dictum). Cf. United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (refusal, notwithstanding
statutory authorization, to appoint psychiatrist to assist indigent defendant deprived defendant of
effective counsel); Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979)
(indigent defendant had right, under statute, to appointment of expert when case would be
prejudiced by absence of expert assistance); United States v. Largan, 330 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (indigent's attorney allowed travel expenses under statute when overseas travel was neces-
sary to take depositions essential to defendant's case); United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421
(N.D. Ala. 1963) (indigent's attorney allowed, under statute, travel expenses necessary to visit
scene of alleged crime and to interview material witnesses).
18. Recognition of the need to provide indigents with expert assistance has come not only
from the courts, see notes 19, 25 infra and accompanying text, but also from other authorities as
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/18
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embodies the right to the appointment of expert assistance for indi-
gents. 19
well. The American Bar Association, for example, has said that schemes established for the assist-
ance of indigents:
should provide for investigatory, expert and other services necessary to an adequate de-
fense. These should include not only those services and facilities needed for an effective
defense at trial but also those that are required for effective defense participation in every
phase of the process, including determinations on pretrial release, competency to stand
trial and disposition following conviction.
ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.5, at 22 (Tent. Draft, 1967) (emphasis added). The rea-
son is that "[t]he quality of representation at trial may be excellent and yet valueless to the defend-
ant if his defense requires the location of a missing witness or the services of a handwriting expert
and no such services are available." Id at 23. One commentator has asserted that "even more
serious than the need for witnesses is the problem of securing information from which to construct
a defense." Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counselfor Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN.
L. REV. 1054, 1060 (1963).
Congress, too, has recognized the need for the government to provide indigents with expert
assistance and has responded by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (Supp. III 1979). Similarly, at
least 40 states now provide for these services, in varying degrees, at state expense. Fifteen state
statutes specifically mention expert assistance, although three states-California, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania-limit express application of expert assistance to capital cases. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (Deering 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508
(1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (West 1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.150 (1978); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 7.135 (Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (1974); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c
(McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(4) (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1501 (Purdon 1980); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 26.05 § I (Vernon 1979); W. VA.
CODE § 51-11-8 (1980). The remaining state statutes deal generally with reimbursing private court
appointed counsel for expenses necessarily incurred in the representation of an indigent criminal
defendant. California and Illinois, in addition to the explicit statutes cited above, also have gen-
eral reimbursement statutes. ALA. CODE §§ 12-19-252, 15-12-21(b) (1977); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.85.100 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2419 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (Deering
1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-403, 21-1-105 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4605 (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.035(1) (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3204 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
34, § 5609 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.1 10(l)(b), .070(3) (Baldwin 1975); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:57 1.11-(A) (West 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 6(d) (1976); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-8-2-1 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
1804.12 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-16-3(A), -8 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (1974);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.51 (Page 1980); S.C. CODE § 17-3-80 (1979); S.D. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 23A-40-8 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2023 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-64-1(3), -7
(1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5205, 5231(2) (1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-163 (1980); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 36.26.090 (1980); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-1-110(a)(ii), -115(b) (1977).
19. Dissenting judges recognized the right to expert assistance long before a majority em-
braced the right. For example, Judge Frank, dissenting in United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565,
572 (2d Cir. 1956), argued:
Furnishing [defendant] with a lawyer is not enough: The best lawyer in the world cannot
competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence cru-
cial to the defense, e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a
pivotal missing witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert accountant or min-
ing engineer or chemist. It might, indeed, reasonably be argued that for the government
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment 20 contem-
plates effective counsel and that a state's denial of effective assistance
violates due process.2' In Powell v. Alabama22 the Court ruled that the
duty to provide counsel for indigents "is not discharged by an assign-
ment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."'2 3 Thus,
some modem federal courts, following cases that recognize expanded
rights for indigent criminal defendants, 24 have held that an indigent's
due process right to effective counsel encompasses his right to the ap-
pointment of an expert to assist in the preparation of the defense. 25
The court in Williams v. Martin,26 however, rested its decision prima-
rily on equal protection grounds. Williams enunciated a two-tailed
test, previously established in Jacobs v. United States,27 to determine
to defray such expenses, which thb indigent accused cannot meet, is essential to that
assistance by counsel which the Sixth Amendment guarantees. . . .[I]f the government
does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor-and represents but an upper-
bracket privilege.
20. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel in state criminal prose-
cutions was limited until the Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that it was
a fundamental right under the fourteenth amendment.
21. Hawk v. Olson, 362 U.S. 271 (1945). Cf. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (effec-
tive assistance in state capital prosecution "is a constitutional requirement of due process which no
member of the Union may disregard"). For an overview of the ineffective assistance question, see
generally Note, Effective Assistance of Counselfor the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1434
(1932).
22. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Id at 71.
24. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
25. United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (dictum); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (dictum); Greer v. Beto, 379 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d
937 (5th Cir. 1967); Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965), aff'd in part and remanded on
other grounds, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), afd,
344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
Other federal courts, however, have refused to extend the rationale. See, e.g., Watson v. Patter-
son, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951); United States ex rel. Huguley v.
Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Similarly, state courts are split on the question. Cases are collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256
(1970).
26. 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
27. 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965). In Jacobs an indigent defendant sought collateral relief to
set aside a prior conviction on the ground that he was insane at the time of trial. The defendant
requested the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist him at his hearing, but the district court
refused to appoint a psychiatrist and denied relief. The court of appeals vacated the judgment,
but it never mentioned equal protection as the ground for its decision. Instead, it cited a number
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/18
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whether the state must provide an expert. First, the case must raise a
substantial question that requires expert testimony for its explication.
Second, the indigent must require expert assistance to develop fully a
defense.2" Because the denial in Williams of appellant's motion for ex-
pert assistance "was not the result of the informed discretion of the trial
judge,"2 9 the court independently examined the record3" to determine
whether appellant's situation satisfied the bifurcated test. The court
noted that the state pathologist conceded that a pulmonary embolism
generally occurs sooner than eight months after an injury, and thus it
found a substantial question that required expert testimony for its reso-
lution.3" The Williams court ruled that "just as the State needed an
expert to prove the cause of death, [appellant] needed an expert to pres-
ent his defense."32 Thus, the court held, appellant had "satisfied the
dual test prescribed in Jacobs to establish that he was denied equal
protection of the law." 33
Williams v. Martin34 is novel because it states clearly35 that the equal
protection clause requires states to appoint experts on a proper show-
ing36 to assist indigent defendants with their defense. Yet the court
of cases based in whole or in part on a state's denial of due process of law to an indigent defend-
ant. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1961); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Consequently, the Williams court's conclusion that Jacobs was based on
an equal protection analysis is questionable.
28. 618 F.2d at 1026. See also United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in
which the court laid down a virtually identical test to determine whether a psychiatrist need be
appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1976) (federal statute provides funds for such appoint-
ments).
29. 618 F.2d at 1026. Indeed, the trial judge indicated his willingness to provide an expert to
assist appellant, but he erroneously thought that no such funds were available. Id at 1024, 1026.
30. Id at 1026.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 1027.
34. 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
35. The Williams court stated that its decision in Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th
Cir. 1965), held that the equalprotection clause mandated the appointment of an expert to assist in
an indigent's defense to a criminal prosecution. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir.
1980). A close examination of Jacobs, however, indicates that the court did not clearly state that
the equal protection clause was the basis for its decision. See note 27 supra. Similarly, the court's
express recognition in Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970), of the equal protection clause
as the foundation for the right was only dictum, because Lee was a civil case and the discussion of
criminal rights was included only as an analogy.
36. Obviously, an indigent defendant must demonstrate that his request for assistance is not
frivolous, because "[t]he determination of the defendant's need for expert assistance is committed
Washington University Open Scholarship
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need not have reached the equal protection question to render its deci-
sion. In addition to finding a denial of equal protection,37 Williams
concluded that the trial judge's refusal to provide an expert violated the
sixth amendment and the fourteenth amendment due process clause by
denying appellant effective assistance of counsel. 38 The court, there-
fore, could have followed other courts39 by relying on the established
due process ground,4° but it chose to enunciate an alternative constitu-
tional doctrine.4'
The Williams decision may have been more compelling had it rested
solely on the due process ineffective assistance of counsel theory.42 The
to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir.
1980). The standard of proof required, however, is apparently not a stringent one, because the
indigent is not required to "prove. . .that an independent expert would [provide] helpful testi-
mony at trial. An indigent prisoner who needs expert assistance because the subject matter is
beyond the comprehension of laymen should not be required to present proof of what an expert
would say when he is denied access to an expert." Id at 1026-27. The Williams court thus
adopted the standard used to determine whether to appoint experts under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)
(1976)-the trial judge "need only be satisfied that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist
counsel in their preparation, not that the defense would be defective without such testimony."
United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966) (emphasis in original).
37. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
38. 618 F.2d at 1027.
39. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
40. Thus, the court could have reversed appellant's conviction on the ground that the trial
court's refusal to provide an expert rendered appellant's attorney ineffective. See notes 20-23
supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the court recognized the viability of the ineffective assist-
ance theory. It quoted with approval a report to the attorney general, which stated that "[u]ntil
such [expert] services are made available, the [system] can not fairly be characterized as [one] of
adequate representation. One of the assumptions of the adversary system is that counsel for the
defense will have at his disposal the tools essential to the conduct of a proper defense." 618 F.2d
at 1025.
Judge Hall, dissenting, accepted the ineffective assistance theory, but on a narrower basis. He
argued that appellant's counsel was negligent in failing to inform the trial judge of the statute, see
note 4 supra, providing funds for expert assistance. Thus, he wrote, he "would reverse for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. That is where the true fault lies." 618 F.2d at 1028 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the court might have reversed on the ground that appellant was denied due process
because the trial judge errantly prevented appellant from taking advantage of the statutory provi-
sion itself. Given the court's holding, however, the existence of the statute is immaterial because,
in appropriate cases, the equal protection clause mandates that the state provide expert assistance
for indigents regardless of whether it has formally appropriated funds for their assistance.
41. The equal protection doctrine that the court announced may be nothing more than a
semantic alternative to the ineffective assistance theory. Whether it differs from due process is
unclear, because the court made no effort to distinguish between the two. See note 46 infra and
accompanying text.
42. Justice Harlan argued consistently that decisions finding rights for indigent criminal de-
fendants must rest on the fourteenth amendment's due process, rather than equal protection,
clause. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35-36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting), he asserted:
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notion that appellant was the victim of an impermissible wealth classi-
fication based on his ability to pay for the services of an expert is inher-
ent in the court's equal protection analysis.43 The court, however,
discussed neither the classification nor the level of scrutiny required on
The issue here is not the typical equal protection question of the reasonableness of a
"classification" on the basis of which the State has imposed legal disabilities, but rather
the reasonableness of the State's failure to remove natural disabilities. . . . I submit that
the basis for [the Court's] holding is simply an unarticulated conclusion that it violates
"fundamental fairness" for a State which provides for appellate review. . . not to see to
it that such appeals are in fact available to those it would imprison for serious crimes.
That of course is the traditional language of due process ....
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963), Justice Harlan argued that application of the
equal protection clause "can lead only to mischievous results." He wrote:
[N]o one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax,
to charge tuition at a state university . . . to impose a standard fine for criminal viola-
tions, or to establish minimum bail for various categories of offenses. Nor could it be
contended that the State may not classify as crimes acts which the poor are more likely to
commit than are the rich.
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the. States "an affirmative duty to
lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." To so construe
it would be to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign
to many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society.
The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of poverty, but it is not
required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can afford.
[N]o matter how far the state rule might go in providing counsel for indigents, it could
never be expected to satisfy an affirmative duty-if one existed--to place the poor on the
same level as those who can afford the best legal talent available.
1d at 361-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also note 46 infra and accompanying text.
43. The gravamen of the equal protection claim is that an indigent without governmental
assistance cannot afford to hire the needed expert whom a nonindigent could engage. Thus he
may be prejudiced and as a result may be convicted and imprisoned, although the nonindigent
may not be. The argument is not without merit:
On the reasoning of Griffin and its progeny, for the states to disallow necessary expert
and investigative services to the indigent as such is a prohibited discrimination between
"rich" and "poor" in the application of their laws. There is a blatant disparity in the
consequences of state action for rich and poor when an indigent defendant, who would
have been found innocent had he had the necessary funds to procure expert witnesses or
investigative assistance, is found guilty.
Note, The Indgent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 632, 640 (1970) (emphasis in original). Similarly, it has
been stated:
Little could be more repugnant to our ideal of equal justice for rich and poor than the
spectre of innocent men convicted because of financial inability to show their innocence.
Even if Gideon v. Wainwright established an unqualified right to representation by coun-
sel at trial, unavailability of funds to pay for costs of investigation and for the services of
expert witnesses still frequently frustrates the efforts of assigned counsel, of public de-
fenders, and of judges to achieve justice.
Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394,
413 (1964) (citations omitted). The author, however, did not view the right as absolute. Rather,
he advocated balancing the harm caused an indigent by the refusal to provide expert assistance
against the societal economic benefit derived from the refusal. The state, he argued, is required to
do only what is "reasonable under all the circumstances." Id at 414.
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review.44 Moreover, although the court said the refusal to provide an
expert breached both appellant's equal protection and due process
rights,45 it made no effort to distinguish between the two rights. 6
The remedy that the Williams court provided further illustrates the
difficulty. Although the court found a violation of appellant's constitu-
tional rights, 47 it indicated that the breach might not be reversible er-
ror.48 The court instructed the district court to appoint an independent
pathologist to investigate the cause of death and to issue the writ of
habeas corpus only if appellant could show that pretrial pathological
assistance was necessary and "might reasonably have affected adjudi-
cation of the cause of death. 4 9
Although the Williams court apparently ignored its own constitu-
tional mandate,5" analysis supports its findings. The equal protection
44. The Supreme Court has refused to label wealth a suspect classification and thereby bring
it within the ambit of strict scrutiny. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). The Court has hinted, however, that, with regard to wealth in criminal proceedings,
states cannot justify disparate treatment between indigents and nonindigents even under the laxer
test that the means chosen to effectuate a state purpose must be rationally related to the end the
state seeks to achieve. "Plainly the ability to pay... bears no rational relationship to a defend-
ant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956). One noted constitutional scholar, however, has sug-
gested that there are "other legitimate state objectives" to which fee requirements, for example,
"do bear a rational relationship," and that "[s]ince wealth has not been accepted as a suspect
classification, something more than the mere existence of economic barriers must be involved to
explain the Court interventions." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 939 (10th ed. 1980).
45. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
46. Although it may be possible in theory to distinguish between the due process and equal
protection rights that the court espouses, it may, in fact, be impossible in practice. Theoretically,
the equal protection clause would require the trial judge to provide an expert before trial on an
indigent defendant's satisfacton of the two-tailed test, although the due process clause would not
because the trial judge cannot know before trial whether, without an expert, an indigent defendant
will be denied effective assistance of counsel. In practice, however, a pretrial showing that an
indigent defendant can satisfy the two-tailed test probably will convince the trial judge that with-
out expert assistance the defendant would be deprived of effective assistance, prompting him to
provide the expert before trial anyway.
47. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
48. 618 F.2d at 1027.
49. Id
50. Judge Hall, in dissent, accused the majority of contradicting itself. The court had said
that:
[I]t is not incumbent upon [appellant] to prove under the Jacobs test that an independent
expert would have provided helpful testimony at trial. An indigent prisoner who needs
expert assistance because the subject matter is beyond the comprehension of laymen
should not be required to present proof of what an expert would say when he is denied
access to an expert.
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issue disappears on appointment of the expert because appellant is
placed in a position equal to that of a nonindigent. The due process
requirement remains, however, that appellant show prejudice before a
new trial may be granted.5 Because the equal protection and the es-
tablished due process tests merge at the remedial stage, the need for the
Williams equal protection analysis is limited.52
Id. at 1026-27. Pointing to the court's remedy, see note 49 supra and accompanying text, Judge
Hall complained that "the pathologist's testimony [is] conclusive on the constitutional issue,"
which he said was "inconsistent with the majority's position that the assistance of an expert was
necessary for an adequate defense, regardless of whether the expert would have provided helpful
testimony at trial." Id at 1028 (Hall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). He concluded by
saying:
The majority declares: "We reverse because we believe that the appointment of an ex-
pert was constitutionally required for [appellant's] adequate defense against a charge for
murder." These are strong words. Appointment of an independent expert to give an
opinion is weak action.
I cannot see how the majority can say so much and do so little.
Id at 1028-29 (Hall, J., dissenting).
5 1. A convicted defendant seeking a new trial must demonstrate that the error complained of
is not harmless, a standard which has its foundation in the proof requirement that a jury may not
convict a defendant unless it believes that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme
Court approved the harmless error rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), in which it
approved the language in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 84, 86-87 (1963), that "[t]he question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction." Under Chapman the standard is that "before a federal constitutional error can
be considered harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 24. Thus, in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1979), the
refusal to appoint a fingerprint expert to assist an indigent defendant did not violate the principles
of due process and fundamental fairness when the evidence against the defendant was so over-
whelming that even favorable testimony from the expert would not have raised a sufficiently rea-
sonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction. Similarly, in Pedrero v.
Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979), the refusal to appoint a
psychiatrist to assist an indigent with his defense was not error when the question of the defend-
ant's sanity was not seriously in issue. Cf. United States v. Sanders, 459 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1972)
(failure to appoint an expert under federal statute providing funding for such appointments re-
quires reversal only on showing that defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's actions).
Various courts allocate the burden of proof of prejudice differently. Under the most liberal
view, a mere showing of ineffectiveness is necessary; defendant need not show prejudice. At the
other end of the spectrum the defendant must show both that his counsel was ineffective and that
he was prejudiced thereby. The hybrid view is that the burden is on the defendant to establish
ineffectiveness, with the burden thereafter shifting to the government to show that it did not
prejudice the defendant. Note, Ineffective Representation as a Basisfor Relief fram Conviction:
Principlesfor.Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 72-73 (1977). For an overview of
the standards applied to appellate review of ineffectiveness claims, and some suggestions for alter-
native approaches, see generally Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards andRemedies,
41 Mo. L. REv. 483, 493-503 (1976).
52. Although the court's remedy in Williams v. Martin was virtually identical to the one
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Williams v. Martin will exert only a slight impact on the appointment
of experts to assist indigent defendants. Certainly the decision sends a
clear signal to state trial judges that, on a proper showing, 53 they must
provide expert assistance at an indigent defendant's request. Thus Wil-
liams should persuade judges to provide experts in cases in which the
due process argument is not sufficiently persuasive.5 4 The Williams
rule also will promote the interests of judicial economy and greater effi-
ciency in the criminal process because it will eliminate the need for new
trials for indigent defendants denied effective assistance of counsel by a
trial court's refusal to provide an expert. Yet the overlap between the
equal protection and due process claims at the remedial stage may, in
practice, make the Williams equal protection analysis superfluous.55
TORTS-INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY-MAINE ALLOWS SUIT FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. MacDonald v. Mac-
Donald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). In MacDonald v. MacDonald' a wife
sought damages from her former husband alleging that his negligent
provided an indigent defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, see notes 47-51 supra and
accompanying text, at least one court has indicated that the Williams test might produce a broader
remedy. In Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979), the
court said that the "decisions in the circuit ... strongly suggest that prejudice will be presumed if
the petitioner shows that the matter on which he needed the assistance of experts was seriously in
issue." Id at 1391 n.9. The "seriously in issue" formulation resembles the first tail of the test used
in Williams: The indigent must show that there is a substantial question which requires expert
testimony for its resolution. See notes 28, 36 supra and accompanying text. If prejudice is pre-
sumed once the defendant satisfies the test, the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice inde-
pendently on appeal absent evidence by the state which rebuts the presumption.
53. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
55. While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has intimated that the standard might produce
new results, see note 52 supra, it has not yet so held, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), refused to extend the doctrine.
In addition, the proliferation of state statutes providing for expert assistance for indigent crimi-
nal defendants may diminish the present need to announce another constitutional right. Pres-
ently, at least 40 states-including all those within the Fourth Circuit-have provided for state
funding of expert assistance for indigents. See note 18 supra. Because courts should not decide
questions of constitutional law if there are other grounds on which a case may be decided, see
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), there should be no need
for the announcement of another constitutional right absent state standards for invoking the stat-
ute that are more stringent than those required by the Constitution.
1. 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). Prusinski v. Prusinski, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), was decided at
the same time on similar facts.
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